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 This paper analyzes the extent to which police behavior in giving speeding tickets differs 
from that of automated cameras, which provide an estimate of the population of speeders.  In 
contrast to the automated cameras, the probability of a ticketed driver being African-American or 
female is significantly higher when the ticket is given by a police officer.  This implies that 
police consider gender and race when issuing speeding tickets.  Potential behavioral reasons of 
this outcome are discussed. The validity of using automated cameras as a population measure for 
police-issued tickets is thoroughly investigated and supportive evidence is provided. 
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Since the seminal work of Becker (1957), which created the theoretical foundation of the 
economics  of  discrimination,  researchers  have  empirically  investigated  the  existence  of 
discrimination in a variety of settings ranging from wages to murder trials.
3  A recent line of 
research along these dimensions is the investigation of racial and gender bias  in motor vehicle 
searches and ticketing for driving violations.  This research explores differential treatment by 
police officers, which is costly to innocent individuals of a targeted race or gender (Durlauf 
2006).  Some researchers  find evidence of raci al  or gender discrimination (Antonovics and 
Knight 2009, Blalock et al. 2007, Makowsky and Stratmann 2009), while others report evidence 
of no discriminatory behavior by law enforcement officers (Knowles et al. 2001, Persico and 
Todd 2007, Grogger and Ridgeway 2006).   
This paper exploits data from automated speed detection to measure differences in the 
proportion of speeding tickets issued to gender and racial groups in Lafayette, Louisiana.  
Automated cameras should be race and gender neutral, since individuals are ticketed by a 
machine, based solely on their speed violation.   By comparing the proportion of women and 
African-Americans who receive tickets from police officers to those who receive tickets from an 
automated source, it is possible to determine if police use gender or race as a determinant in 
issuing speeding tickets.  I find that police consider gender and race when deciding to ticket 
speeders.   In the majority of specifications bo th effects are statistically and  economically 
significant.  This result holds even when accounting for potential endogeneity of the location of 
officers and automated devices. 
                                                 
3 For example, Munnell et al. (1996) control for credit worthiness, labor characteristics, race, gender, age, job 
history, and neighborhood characteristics in identifying the impact of race on mortgage rejection rates.  Argys and 
Mocan (2004) investigate the impact of race and gender on death row commutation by controlling for characteristics 
of the criminal and crime, as well as the governor’s party affiliation, race, and gender.  
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Police  may  be  disproportionately  issuing  speeding  tickets  to  women  and  African-
Americans due to preference-based discrimination, or because of statistical discrimination.  If 
police enjoy issuing tickets to women and/or African-Americans, they derive an additional non-
monetary  benefit  by  ticketing  these  individuals,  which  is  considered  preference-based 
discrimination.  Evidence of the existence of preference-based discrimination is the only way a 
court will overturn a specific practice by police (Durlauf 2005).  Differential treatment based on 
gender (or race) is considered statistical discrimination if police officers use gender (or race) as a 
proxy for a relevant characteristic which is difficult to observe.  For example, perhaps police 
frequently ticket women because, on average, they are more likely to pay a speeding ticket fine 
instead of going to court to contest it (Blalock et al. 2007).   
Police officers have a strong incentive to issue tickets which will result in revenues for 
the  city,  because  the  city  determines  the  budget  of  the  police  department  (Makowsky  and 
Stratmann 2009).  If women (African-Americans) are less likely to contest a speeding ticket, it is 
economically  feasible  to  issue  tickets  to  women  (African-Americans),  because  doing  so 
decreases the chance that the officer will have to go to court.  If the officer has to attend court, 
the marginal cost of issuing that speeding ticket is much higher.  Police may also target women 
or African-Americans if they believe these individuals are more dangerous drivers or are more 
likely to change their future behavior as a result of a ticket.  In the context of this analysis, it is 
impossible to distinguish between tastes versus revenue maximizing police behavior; however, 
the first-order issue is whether or not these types of behaviors exist at all.
4  Though taste for 
discrimination cannot be ruled out, later I present evidence that police behave rationally in that 
they issue tickets more frequently to drivers speeding more than 15 miles an hour over the limit 
                                                 
4 In another piece (Quintanar 2011), I test whether police behavior found in this paper is the result of statistical or 
preference-based discrimination by linking the speeding ticket data to choices made by individuals in dealing with 
those tickets throughout the court process.  
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(rather than only traveling 5-14 miles an hour above the speed limit), which is associated with 
higher fines.
5 
Due to the uniqueness of the data, this paper provides numerous distinct advantages over 
previous literature.  Observing the entire population of speeders is nearly impossible when 
analyzing the speeding behavior of a whole city, however, automated camera tickets are given to 
every speeding car that passes in front of the camera.  Therefore, the automated tickets provide 
an entirely objective measure of the speeding population in a given location, which has not 
previously been used in this type of analysis.   Also, in contrast to past research, the present 
dataset was not collected as a result of a lawsuit.
6  Post-lawsuit data are problematic because 
police are aware of data collection, as well as its purpose, and may ch ange their behavior to 
avoid punishment  (Grogger  and Ridgeway  2006, Blalock  et al.  2007, Knowles et al. 2001, 
Persico and Todd 2007, and Makowsky and Stratmann 2009).  
II. Existing Literature 
  One major issue facing researchers is to find an appropriate measure of the population of 
offenders to compare to the group who are ticketed, searched, or stopped by police.  Grogger and 
Ridgeway (2006) are able to estimate the population at risk of being stopped by police by using 
the concept of a “veil of darkness.”  During the daytime, as opposed to nighttime, it is possible 
that police use the race of a driver as a determinant of whether or not to stop a car since the 
driver is visible.  Using this rationale, if the race distribution of drivers stopped in darkness, with 
no visibility, is different than the distribution stopped during daylight; this would be evidence 
that police engage in racial profiling.  Grogger and Ridgeway (2006) exploit information from 
                                                 
5 Makowsky and Stratmann (2009) report a similar finding: police are more likely to issue a ticket to a driver who 
was travelling at a faster speed. 
6 Lafayette, Louisiana has no history of legal action taken against the police department for suspected racial or 
gender based discrimination.  
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daylight savings time to control for driving patterns, and do not find significant evidence of 
racial profiling in Oakland, California.  Section VI uses a similar methodology to examine the 
validity of using automated cameras as the population measure for police-issued tickets. 
Many  researchers  utilize  stop  and  search  data,  where  police  report  drivers  who  are 
stopped, the population measure, as well as those who are stopped and subsequently searched.  
Knowles, Persico, and Todd (2001) find equal success rates for drug searches of motor vehicles 
driven by blacks and whites in Maryland, thus implying that police engage in statistical, not 
preference-based  discrimination.    However,  Antonovics  and  Knight  (2009)  expand  upon  the 
methodology of Knowles et al. (2001) and provide evidence that preference-based discrimination 
is the more likely explanation for racial disparity in motor vehicle searches since the officer’s 
race impacts likelihood of being searched.   
Similarly,  findings  regarding  gender  discrimination  are  inconclusive.    Blalock  et  al. 
(2007) find that in the majority of locations women were more likely to receive speeding or 
vehicle maintenance (non-working headlights, etc.) tickets than men.
7  Persico and Todd (2007) 
generalize the application of their own method using motor vehicle stop and search data, and find 
no gender discrimination by police.
8  However, Makowsky and Stratman (2009) find females are 
less likely to receive a fine than males. 
In most of the existing literature on this topic, analyses are based necessarily on post -
lawsuit data (Grogger and Ridgeway 2006, Blalock et al. 2007, Knowles et al. 2001, Persico and 
Todd 2007, and Makowsky and Stratmann 2009).  Data collection on police behavior generally 
begins as a result of public suspicion of unfair treatment of African -Americans and the ensuing 
lawsuit filed against the city or police department.   If police officers change their behavior in 
                                                 
7 Blalock et al. (2007) look at five locations. 
8 Persico and Todd (2007) focus mainly on racial discrimination, but also investigate gender discrimination.  Again, 
they find no evidence of racial discrimination.  
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order to avoid punishment or stigma, the results obtained from the analysis of post-behavioral 
change data will reflect a lower-bound estimate of the extent of racial/gender profiling.  The 
dataset  used  in  this  paper  has  a  distinct  advantage  because  it  was  collected  without  prior 
knowledge of the Lafayette police department and similarly, the department has no history of 
legal action regarding discrimination or racial profiling.  Also, the automated camera system 
being used in Lafayette was installed to improve traffic safety, with no consideration of other 
types of crime reduction or investigation of negative police behavior. 
Another common issue in the literature on traffic stops is nonreporting (Grogger and 
Ridgeway 2006, Knowles et al. 2001, Persico and Todd 2007, Makowsky and Stratmann 2009), 
which occurs when police officers are asked to record stops and tickets issued, but fail to report 
all of them.  Nonreporting is a problem for studies which investigate behaviors conditional upon 
being stopped (likelihood of being issued a speeding ticket, given that you are stopped by the 
police, for example) because the population is not being measured accurately.  Audit studies 
have found a large discrepancy between actual stops and reported stops, especially in initial data 
collection, where up to 70% of stops were not recorded (Grogger and Ridgeway 2006).  The 
nonreporting problem is not an issue in the present paper, because the dataset utilized herein 
includes the universe of all issued tickets and the results are not conditional upon being stopped.   
III. Data Source and Descriptive Statistics 
Lafayette began implementing automated speed cameras in October 2007, with the help 
of  Redflex,  the  company  that  created  and  helps  to  run  these  programs  across  the  U.S.  and 
Australia.  The dataset is compiled of speeding tickets given by the automated cameras and all 
speeding tickets given by the Lafayette Police Department.  Specific details of the data and how 
they were collected are discussed below.  
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1. The City of Lafayette 
Lafayette is a city in southern Louisiana with a population of 133,985, about 60 miles 
west of Baton Rouge (Census 2000).  About 65% of Lafayette residents are white and about 30% 
African-American.  Lafayette encompasses five zip codes, 70501, 70503, 70506, 70507, and 
70508.  Each of these areas has quite different characteristics.  Specifically, 69.2% of 70501 
residents  are  African-American,  as  opposed  to  70503  and  70508,  where  less  than  10%  of 
residents are African-American (Census 2000).  The gender composition throughout the city 
does not vary significantly between zip codes, ranging from 47.5% male to 48.8% male (Census 
2000).    However,  income  disparity  seems  to  follow  a  similar  pattern  as  the  city’s  racial 
composition.  Per capita income in the northern area of the city, where there are many more 
African-American residents, is the lowest, at $12,873, while in the other areas it is higher than 
$25,000 (Census 2000).  Since the socio-economic characteristics of some of Lafayette’s zip 
codes are drastically different, and some are very similar, throughout the remaining paper these 
zip codes are grouped as follows: 70501 and 70507 compose Area 1, 70503 and 70508 comprise 
Area 2, and 70506 is Area 3. 
2. Police Issued Tickets 
The Lafayette City Court database contains every misdemeanor ticket given by an officer 
in the Lafayette police department within the city limits.
9  The database includes information on 
the ticketed individual, the badge and name of the police officer who wrote the ticket, time, 
place, legal speed limit, and speed traveled.   Name, gender, age, and home address are  taken 
from the license of the driver,  but race is not printed on Louisiana licenses.  Officers must 
individually determine the race of the driver, and this information is provided in the dataset.  The 
                                                 
9 All tickets coded as speeding tickets (86-violation number) as well as speeding tickets reduced to a lesser charge 
are included in the Lafayette City Court computer database and in the present dataset.  Tickets given by State 
Troopers in the city limits are not in this database.     
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interpretation by the officer is reliable because officers generally ask each speeder about their 
race.  Also, for those drivers with multiple offenses, the personal information about the speeder 
is cross-checked when entered into the database.   
The majority of officers in the Police Department are white males.  Even more strikingly, 
less than 3% of tickets in the sample are given by officers who are non-white males.  Due to the 
lack of variation in officer characteristics, it is not useful to control for the officer’s race or 
gender. 
Police officers use discretion in issuing speeding tickets, but Lafayette City Court sets 
fines.  This is vital, especially in reference to existing research where police motives in issuing 
tickets may also affect the fine amounts (Makowsky and Stratman 2009).  Therefore, differences 
in fines are not relevant in police behavior. 
3. Automated Tickets 
Lafayette  Consolidated  Government,  and  not  the  police  department,  decided  to 
implement  the Redflex program  and oversee its  technology in  an attempt  to improve traffic 
safety.
10  The speed cameras are available in two forms: a fixed camera at traffic lights to  catch 
both  speeders  and  vehicles  that  run  red  lights,  and  in  “speed  vans”  which  park  at  different 
locations throughout the city.  The program was implemented in October 2007 with two speed 
vans giving citations at about 35 different locations.   
Though the automated ticketing system continues today, the sample period used in this 
paper extends from October 2007 to February 2008.  During this time, the speed vans gave 
citations at 64 different locations.  The Department of Traffic and Transportation, a department 
within  Lafayette  Consolidated  Government,  determined  acceptable  locations  from  accident 
                                                 




statistics and individual requests for vans to be placed in specific areas with a speeding problem.  
Once the requested locations were verified to be safe for a van location, they were added to the 
list, and continue to be added and removed over the entire sample period.  On a particular day 
and at specific times, the vans are told to locate at randomly selected locations from the overall 
list. 
In December of 2007, automated cameras were placed at four traffic lights in Lafayette.  
By February of 2008, there were seven stoplight cameras.  These cameras were installed at the 
intersections  with  the  highest  crash  ratings,  based  on  an  analysis  of  about  30,000  crashes 
(Lafayette  Consolidated  Government).    The  cameras  on  both  vans  and  traffic  lights  are 
completely automatic, and take photographs of the vehicle and driver whenever they detect a car 
that is traveling faster than the speed limit.   
The Redflex database contains every ticket given by automated traffic light cameras as 
well as those tickets given by speed vans.  A paper ticket is sent to the registered owner of the 
car, who is assumed to be the photographed driver.  Lafayette Consolidated Government officials 
estimate that about five to ten percent of the time, the person driving is not the car’s registered 
owner.  Individuals wrongly issued a ticket can choose to pay or refute the ticket by naming the 
actual  driver  of  the  car,  who  the  ticket  will  be  issued  to  instead.    It  is  more  common  for 
individuals to just pay the ticket instead of arguing, especially instances where a young person 
was driving a parent’s car, etc.
11   
The information available from the automated tickets is: name and home address of the 
registered owner of the vehicle, location, time and date of the ticket, legal speed limit, and speed 
                                                 
11The information in the preceding paragraph was provided through personal communication with Tony Trammel, 
Director of the Department of Traffic and Transportation.  Instances when a ticket was refuted can be observed in 
the data because a letter is added to the citation number every time the ticket is contested and reassigned.  This 
occurs rarely, in about 7% of the sample.  
9 
 
traveled.  There are also four pictures on each ticket, most importantly, two of the driver, from 
which gender and race can be determined.
12  Since automated tickets are easier to give and 
require less manpower, they are issued much more frequently than police tickets.  During the 
sample period the average number of automated tickets was 3,100 per month. 
4. Data 
  The sample includes every speeding ticket issued between 6:00 A.M. and 6:59 P.M. from 
October 2007 to February 2008.  The police portion of the data includes every ticket issued by a 
Lafayette city police officer within the city limits.  Since the number of automated tickets had to 
be  handled  record  by  record,  and  each  individual’s  characteristics  had  to  be  manually 
determined,  a  15%  random  sample  was  chosen  from  the  population  of  automated  tickets.  
Because of low visibility of individual drivers at night, only daytime tickets are used in the main 
analysis so that race and gender can be identified.  In a later analysis, a longer time period of 
police-issued tickets are utilized, to take advantage of differences in visibility in a similar manner 
to Grogger and Ridgeway (2006). 
Table 1 lists descriptive statistics of all ticket data.  About 26% of ticketed drivers are 
African-American and 46% are female.  Half of the tickets are given in Area 1, the area with a 
higher proportion of African-American  residents.  The average ticketed driver was  traveling 
about 51 miles an hour, with 79% of ticketed drivers speeding between 5 and 15 miles over the 
legal limit.  
To provide a sense of the differences between tickets given by police and the automated 
system, Table 2 lists descriptive statistics broken down by area and source of ticket.  Police issue 
a significantly higher proportion of speeding tickets to African-Americans than the automated 
                                                 
12 One is a close up of the driver’s seat, while the other is taken from a further distance and has the entire front of the 
car in view.  
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sources in Area 1.  In the other areas, police issue the same proportion of speeding tickets to 
African-Americans as the automated sources.  However, there is an obvious difference in the 
proportion of tickets issued to women by automated cameras compared to police officers.  In 
Areas 1 and 3 this difference is statistically significant; where police give 51% and 58% of 
tickets to women, respectively, but automated sources give about 40% in both areas. 
5. Motivation for Police Behavior 
Merely because police issue a disproportionate amount of tickets to women and African-
Americans does not mean that they are engaging in discriminatory behavior.  Perhaps there is 
another difference in how tickets are issued, such as the cost of issuing tickets.  The automated 
cameras can easily issue tickets to every car that passes, but police must spend time to issue a 
ticket, and while issuing tickets they must let other speeders pass unpunished.   
Table  2  illustrates  this  more  clearly  by  looking  at  the  means  of  the  speed-related 
variables.    For  instance,  the  variables  which  measure  how  fast  an  individual  was  traveling 
illustrate an important difference between the automatically issued tickets and police tickets: the 
majority of automated tickets are issued at lower severities of speeding.
13  Conversely, most 
police issued tickets are given in the  16-20 Miles Over range.  Merely 8% of all police issued 
tickets are given to motor vehicles traveling only 5-10 miles above the speed limit.  Police stop 
and ticket individuals who are traveling at higher speeds because the cost of stopping speeders is 
the same regardless  of  speed, but  the marginal benefit  is  greater for more severe offenders.  
Individuals  who receive tickets for higher speeds must pay a higher fine,
14 which results in 
                                                 
13 Though, note that neither police officers nor the automated system issue tickets to speeders traveling 5 miles or 
less over the speed limit. 
14 Lafayette City Court bases fines on the severity of the speeding violation, however, individuals who have received 




higher revenues for the City of Lafayette, and in turn, likely a higher budget for the police 
department (Makowsky and Stratmann 2009).  
  Figures  1  and  2  further  illustrate  the  different  ticket  issuing  behavior  of  police  and 
automated sources.  In Figure 1, the tendency for police officers to ticket higher speeders is 
easily observable, as the majority of tickets seem to be issued between 13 and 17 miles over the 
limit.  Tickets issued for speeders traveling between 15 and 17 miles over the limit are associated 
with significantly higher fines than tickets issued for violations of 5 to 14 miles over the limit, 
which may provide an incentive for officers to focus on more extreme speeders.  Some may 
argue that police officers ticket higher speeders because they are more dangerous, however, there 
is unlikely to be a difference in the level of danger between speeders traveling 14 miles over the 
limit and 15.  Despite this fact, the number of tickets issued by police to speeders jumps as the 
speeding severity crosses the 15 miles per hour threshold.  Along these lines, Garrett and Wagner 
(2009) use annual data from North Carolina counties to show that police issue significantly more 
tickets in years following a decline in revenue, which also illustrates the importance of fiscal 
concerns when issuing tickets. 
Figure 2 illustrates the relative frequency of speeding tickets issued by speed over the 
limit for the automated cameras (speed vans and traffic lights).  In Figure 2, the majority of 
tickets are issued to drivers traveling between 8 and 10 miles over the limit.  This difference in 
police officer behavior from the automated ticket “behavior” implies that police use different 
criteria when issuing speeding tickets than automated cameras.   
When using stop and search data, police may use race as a proxy for carrying drugs or 
weapons and thus use a violation as the official reason to stop a car, but in reality are interested 
in searching the vehicle for said contraband.  If this type of statistical discrimination exists in  
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issuing speeding tickets, more African-Americans will receive speeding issued tickets, though 
not as a result of racial bias.  In Lafayette, police consider speeding a serious offense in and of 
itself, and assume that vehicle maintenance issues are more strongly correlated with likelihood to 
carry illegal substances or weapons.  Police are less likely to use speeding as a reason to pull 
over and search a vehicle than they are to use visible vehicle maintenance issues, specifically in 
high crime areas.  Furthermore, drug crimes and gun violence are not a critical concern for the 
city of Lafayette, so this type of statistical discrimination should not play a major role in stops 
within the city.
15 
One potential data issue that is not present in other literature arises because Lafayette is a 
relatively small city, where the majority of officers are white males.  If police officers happen to 
stop individuals they know personally (e.g. another white male), and let them go without a ticket, 
the results may create an impression of race or gender bias when it is actually a result of 
corruption, based on personal relationships.  Even if this was the case, the effect should be minor 
since the city is large enough that police officers do not know everyone.  Also, the magnitude of 
the results here are substantial enough that  it is unlikely that they are driven by this type of 
behavior. 
IV. Validity of Automated Tickets as a Population Measure 
1. Automated Tickets: Vans and Traffic Light Cameras 
As previously discussed, the automated cameras come in two forms: fixed cameras at 
traffic lights and mobile vans.  If drivers behave differently at traffic lights, then using traffic 
light cameras as a comparable measure of the speeding population will not be accurate.  Perhaps 
individuals are more cautious and slow down when crossing an intersection, while they speed on 
                                                 
15 The Lafayette Police Department provided the information in the preceding paragraph through personal 
communication; specific behavior within the city of Lafayette, excluding highways.  
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other stretches of the same road.  Similarly, residents of Lafayette are generally aware of which 
intersections have a traffic light camera, so it is possible that individuals change their driving 
behavior in these areas in order to avoid a fine.
16  If women and African-Americans are more risk 
averse, they may avoid intersections with traffic cameras or may be more caut ious by driving 
slowly in these areas.  If this is the case, a low er proportion of automated tickets given to 
African-Americans and women may reflect this change in behavior, rendering the comparison 
between police tickets and automated tickets invalid.   
Figures 3 and 4 illustrate that drivers do behave differently when driving past a speed van 
camera and a traffic light camera.  While the majority of speed van speeding tickets are issued to 
individuals driving between 6 and 16 miles over the limit, more  than 60% of the traffic light  
tickets are given to drivers traveling between 8 and 10 miles over the limit.   
Functionally, speed vans provide a more accurate comparison to police officers.  Speed 
vans move in a random fashion, making it more difficult for drivers to predict their locations and 
they are as easy to identify as a police car.  Therefore, drivers should behave in the same manner 
around police cars and speed vans.   For the reasons listed above, it seems likely that driver 
behavior around speed vans is more similar to their behavior around police officers than their 
behavior at intersections with traffic light cameras. 
2. Automated versus Police-Issued 
  In order for the automated issued tickets to provide a valid comparison group to police 
issued  tickets,  both  ticketing  sources  must  measure  the  same  driving  (speeding)  population.  
Police observe the population of speeders, but are only able to ticket a select number, while the 
automated cameras ticket the entire population of speeders objectively.  If police do not observe 
                                                 
16 As in Bar-Ilan and Sacerdote (2004), where they find individuals do alter behavior in order to avoid an increase in 
a fine for running a red light.  It is not hard to imagine this same behavior in order to avoid a speeding ticket.   
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the same population, any difference in ticketing may be the result of the different population of 
speeders and not a difference in ticketing behavior.  While there are some procedural differences 
that need to be considered, the descriptive evidence below suggests that the populations being 
measured are comparable.  In Section VIII, I more explicitly account for potential endogeneity 
with propensity score matching and exploitation of police visibility using daylight savings time. 
  The  first  step  to  show  the  equivalence  of  the  police-observed  population  and  the 
automated-observed population is to understand the exogenous locating procedures used for both 
ticketing sources.  If police have the freedom to patrol where they please, they may choose to 
target areas where certain groups travel.  For example, if police have a preference for ticketing 
African-Americans, and locate where more African-Americans travel, more African-Americans 
will receive tickets.  If the automated tickets are not given in those specific areas, the amount of 
tickets  issued  to  African-Americans  by  police  would  be  higher  in  comparison  to  automated 
tickets  in  other  areas,  but  this  would  reflect  the  differential  exposure  rates,  not  police 
discrimination.
17 
In the case of tickets issued by police, the data only specify the location  of the violation, 
but not how or why the officer was located there.  There are two different types of police officers 
who issue speeding tickets; traffic officers and patrol officers.  Traffic officers are sent to 
specifically target speeders and other traffic offenders, while patrol officers can be sent for these 
                                                 
17 Another scenario may initially seem plausible as well, motivated by the difference in means of speed limit by 
ticketing type, as seen in Table 2.  Since automated cameras ticket on streets with a higher average speed limit than 
police, perhaps these automated cameras are being placed on busier roads used for commuting, while police are 
locating in neighborhoods and school areas, where there are other safety concerns besides speeding.  If this is the 
case, and women and African-Americans are more likely to travel in neighborhoods, while men and whites are more 
likely to travel on the busy commuting routes, then the results herein are being driven by this fact and not police 
discrimination.  This scenario cannot be the driving force of these results however, because the neighborhoods and 
school zones where police are locating are public schools with a majority of white students, and white 
neighborhoods.  Therefore, if different ticketing populations were the true source of the differential ticketing, whites 
would receive more tickets from police than automated sources, the opposite of the present findings.  Though there 
is not as simple of an explanation regarding gender, it is unlikely that this type of selection could be driving the 
entire result.  
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or more general reasons.  Both types of officers are assigned to certain areas in Lafayette for 
each shift, and thus should not be differentially locating based on gender or race of individuals.
18  
Even if only traffic officers’ tickets are used, there is no difference in results. 
  Although the mobile automated cameras are randomly assigned to a location during the 
day, the locations themselves are not completely random.  First, only areas where it is safe to 
place a van will be placed on the master list.  In this context, “safe” is used only in reference to 
van parking; streets with no shoulder or sidewalk may be considered “unsafe” because there is a 
significant risk of danger from passing traffic merely by parking there.
19  However, this should 
not be a major issue.  Redflex states that its mobile cameras can be used, “on suburban streets, as 
well as on higher-speed thoroughfares, either by parking in a safe position on the roadway or 
nearby for added safety” (Redflex, 2010).  Based on this definition, it is feasible that police will 
also search for speeders in a “safe” spot, despite the fact that this is not explicitly stated in police 
procedure. 
  The other source of non-randomness in speed van locations is that the initial acceptable 
list includes areas known to have speeding problems; and as such, tend to be busier streets 
instead  of  neighborhood  roads.    Similarly,  because  the  goal  of  this  program  is  to  reduce 
speeding, the areas that have the most impact on speeders also tend to be busier city streets.  This 
can be seen in Table 2, where the majority of tickets issued by automated sources are issued on 
streets with relatively high speed limits.  Over time, because individuals can request a van be 
placed in their neighborhood, these neighborhood locations are added to the list, but the number 
                                                 
18 The Lafayette Police Department provided the information in the preceding paragraph through personal 
communication. 
19 The important distinction here is that vans or police officers may still choose to locate in high crime areas, if those 
areas also suffer from speeding drivers.  
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of tickets issued on busier streets is much larger than the number of tickets issued on streets with 
lower legal speed limits. 
  Police also locate on busy streets, but they tend to focus more on ticketing speeders in 
neighborhoods, particularly near schools.  In school zones, the legal speed is much lower than 
larger city streets.  This is one reason why the average speed limit for police issued tickets is less 
than the mean speed for automated issued tickets.  Police locate in neighborhoods, but generally 
on streets with high traffic volume; streets with low speed limits that are used by a large number 
of travelers.  This does not affect the validity of the comparison, because vans locate in nearly 
the same areas as well.
20  
The ideal measure of the police-observed speeding population is to use all drivers at the 
locations where police issue tickets.  However, this is not feasible for several reasons.  The most 
obvious of these reasons is that if automated sources and police  officers chose to locate at the 
same locations, they would not be maximizing speed-deterrence.  If a police officer is traveling 
to a designated spot to target speeders, and upon arriving sees a mobile van, he/she will most 
likely travel to a nearby street, or nearby block.  In the sampl e, as can be seen  from Figure 5, 
there are some instances where an automated van camera and police officer ticketed a speeder in 
the same location, however, it is more common for tickets to be issued nearby, generally within a 
block or two.  This does not create a bias, because individuals who drive in neighborhoods also 
must drive on the busier city streets where vans are located nearby.   
  Figure 5 shows the city of Lafayette, with dots representing the frequency of tickets 
issued by each ticketing source, at specific locations.  Empty dots represent police-issued tickets 
and the darkest filled dots represent speed van issued tickets.  The dots are sized proportionately 
                                                 
20 When school zones are excluded from the analysis, the police coefficient is actually larger than before.  
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to the frequency of tickets that were issued at that location.
21  For example, in many instances 
only one ticket is issued in a location and these d ots are the smallest on Figure 5 .  Similarly, 
there are relatively few locations where more than 100 tickets are issued during the range of data 
collection for the sample.  This generally occurs w hen tickets are issued by automated sources, 
but there are a few police issued locations where this is also true.   
The western portion of the map, which includes zip codes 70506 and 70503, illustrates a 
fairly equal coverage of mobile vans and police officers.  This is extremely close to the ideal of 
having speeding tickets issued by automated sources and police officers in the exact same 
locations.  Since there are automated vans and police officers in near proximity to one another, it 
is feasible to assume that both ticketing sources are observing the same population of speeders, 
when controlling for time of day, day of the week, etc.   
However, the northern portion of the map, above Interstate 10, is zip code 70507, is not 
useful in this comparison, because the only source of automated tickets is one traffic light camera 
at the northern city limit.  No speed van tickets were issued here.   Because this area of the city 
has a large number of African-American residents, it is no surprise that speeding tickets issued in 
this zip code will be issued disproportionately to African -Americans.  Since there are  no valid 
comparison automated tickets issued in this area, there is not an accurate measure of the speeding 
population.  Therefore, I exclude  this area from the remaining analysis.  The exclusion of this 
area does not impact the validity of the results, because this results in a sample size reduction of 
only 77 tickets.  Similarly, this is a relatively small portion of the overall city with the bulk of the 
area being residential.  The main commercial areas and majority of city neighborhoods are south 
                                                 
21 Size of the bubbles was determined based on the equation:  Size = (Frequency of Tickets Issued / Maximum 
Frequency of Tickets Issued at One Location).  
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of Interstate 10.  For these reasons, the remaining analysis will not include tickets issued in the 
zip code of 70507. 
Though there is a greater discrepancy between police and automated ticket locations in 
the remaining zip codes, 70501 and 70508, tickets are still issued within blocks of each other.  
Vans and police officers issue tickets in the same neighborhoods, or a police officer may issue 
tickets within a neighborhood while a van issues tickets on a nearby street where those residents 
must travel to get home.  Therefore, automated tickets remain a valid measure of the speeding 
population. 
Figures 6 and 7 provide the same evidence as Figure 5, but they show tickets only where 
race or gender is observable.  These three maps show that police tickets and tickets generated by 
automated sources are issued in nearly identical locations.  The estimation methods and results 
are discussed in the following sections, but due to the differences between traffic light cameras 
and police issued tickets, traffic light tickets are not included in the main specifications.
22   
V. Methods 
  If the racial and gender composition of speeders who are ticketed by police is different 
than the racial and gender composition of the entire population of speeders, police are treating 
individuals differently based on gender and/or race.  However, observing the entire population of 
speeders is costly, and nearly impossible when looking at the speeding behavior of a whole city.  
Alternatively, because the automated tickets are given to every speeding car detected by the 
camera,  automated  ticket  systems  provide  a  measure  of  the  speeding  population  in  a  given 
location.    This  technique  also  provides  an  advantage  over  previous  literature,  where  the 
                                                 
22 When traffic light cameras are included, the results are qualitatively the same and can be provided upon request.  
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population measures are not completely objective.
23  If police do not consider race or gender 
when they issue tickets, then the proportion of tickets issued to certain sub -groups of the 
population (such as females or African-Americans) should not differ between police and vans or 
light cameras.   
I will use individual level tickets to investigate police behavior in issuing speeding 
tickets.  Thus, I address the following empirical question: Given a driver is caught speeding and 
issued a ticket, is the probability of being black (or female) the same regardless of the ticketing 
source, that is 
  (     |             )       (     |                )? 
The analysis will be performed at the individual level, with the dependent variable a 
dummy  equal  to  1  if  the  ticketed  individual  is  African-American  and  0  otherwise  (or 
female/male).  The advantage of the individual-level analysis is that the richness of the data will 
allow for control of most factors that police may use to decide whether to ticket an individual, 
such as severity of the speed violation, the speed limit where the ticket was given, as well as 
other determinants  of ticketing, which include the day of the  week, and the location of the 
infraction.  The specification is depicted by Equation (1) 
(1)               
                
where    is equal to 1 if the recipient is black, and zero otherwise (or equal to 1 if the 
recipient is female and 0 otherwise),    includes specific characteristics of the violation, and      
is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the ticket was given by a police officer and 0 if the ticket was 
given by an automated source.  In this specification, if the coefficient of the dummy variable for 
                                                 
23 For example, Grogger and Ridgeway (2006) use tickets issued at night as a population measure, but police can 
likely still observe car type, which may be correlated with race.  Therefore, this may not be a completely objective 
measure of the population.  
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a police-given ticket ( ) is positive and statistically significant, this implies that race (or gender) 
may play a role in a police officer’s decision to pull over and ticket a speeder. 
VI. Results 
Table 3 shows the results of estimating Equation (1), using only tickets issued by police 
officers and speed vans.  The entries are marginal effects; and robust standard errors, clustered 
by area, are reported in parentheses.  The areas are broken down into their respective zip codes, 
as  previously  defined,
24  and each column successively increases the  number of  zip codes 
included in estimation.   Column I (IV) only includes tickets issued in areas with the greatest 
overlap of ticket locations for police and speed vans.  Column II (V) includes an additional zip 
code which also contains ticket locations that are very similar, followed by Column III  (VI) 
which includes all zip codes except for 70507, where no automated van tickets are issued.  
Restricting the area significantly decreases the sample size, but in all specifications the marginal 
effect for the police dummy variable remains positive and significant.   All columns control for 
area fixed effects, whether the ticket was given in the first half of the month, whet her the ticket 
was issued during morning or evening rush hour, the legal speed limit where the ticket was 
issued, severity of the speeding violation (11-15 Miles Over, 16-20 Miles Over, and More than 
20 Miles Over), time controls, and day of the week fixed effects. 
The  police  coefficient  is  positive  and  significant  in  the  first  three  columns,  where 
African-American  is  the  dependent  variable,  implying  that  the  probability  of  being  African-
American  is  higher  if  the  ticket  was  given  by  a  police  officer  than  if  it  was  given  by  an 
automated source.  In Column III, Area 1 is positive and statistically significant, as expected, 
implying that African-Americans receive more tickets and reflecting the fact that Area 1 has a 
                                                 
24 Area 1 is 70501, Area 2 is 70503 and 70508, and Area 3 is 70506.  Recall that Lafayette has an additional zip 
code, 70507, which is not included due to a lack of adequate ticketing by the automated sources.  The fundamental 
results are the same when police precincts are used as area controls instead of zip codes.  
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large  number  of  African-American  residents.    Conversely,  there  are  relatively  few  African-
American  residents  in  Area  2  (less  than  10%),  and  the  estimated  coefficient  for  Area  2  is 
statistically  significant  and  negative  in  all  specifications.    HalfMonth  1  is  added  to  test 
conventional wisdom that police ticket differentially depending on the time of month, but is not 
significant in any specification.   
The next control is legal speed limit.  As previously discussed, some tickets are given on 
busy city roads, and others on neighborhood streets, so this control will help to further specify 
driving patterns.  LegalSpeed is statistically significant, but is close to zero.   
The controls for severity of the violation are a range of dummy variables (11-15 Miles 
Over, 16-20 Miles Over, More than 20 Miles Over) which are equal to one if the violation was 
within  the  range  and  0  otherwise.    These  controls  are  not  consistently  significant  in  any 
specification.  Day of the week fixed effects are included to further control for driving patterns.  
Saturday is positive and significant in Columns I and III, though no other day fixed effects are 
consistently significant.   
I use a dummy variable, RushHour, to control for travel differences, which is equal to 1 if 
the ticket is given between 7:00 am and 8:59 am or 5:00 pm and 6:59 pm, and 0 otherwise.  The 
impact of RushHour is significant in Columns I and II.  In a similar vein, since driving patterns 
may differ by race or  gender based on the time of day the ticket  was issued (Grogger and 
Ridgeway 2006, Blalock et al. 2007), the last controls are hourly controls: 6:00 to 8:59 AM, 9:00 
to 11:59 AM, 12:00 to 2:59 PM, 3:00 to 5:59 PM, and 6:00 to 6:59 PM.  The hourly controls are 
significant, though of differing magnitudes.  
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Overall, the results using the largest sample area indicate that, all else the same, it is 
about 8 percentage points more likely that the recipient of a police-given speeding ticket is black, 
as opposed to the recipient of a speed van issued ticket.   
The latter three columns of Table 3 present the results where the dependent variable is a 
dummy equal to 1 if the violator is female and 0 if the violator is male.  The initial probit 
estimation, where the sample zip codes include 70506 and 70503, estimates the marginal effect 
of police to be .209, and is statistically significant at a 5% level.  The magnitude of this result 
should be interpreted with caution, due to the relatively small sample.  In Columns V and VI, 
with the larger sample area, the police coefficient remains statistically significant at the 5% level, 
while its magnitude decreases to .138.
25   
The police coefficient of the model including the larger area indicates that conditional on 
being issued a ticket, the probability of a speeding ticket being received by a female is about 14 
percentage points higher when the ticket was issued by a police officer.  Since there are no 
significant advantages to reducing the sample area, the remaining tables will include tickets 
issued in 70506, 70503, 70508, and 70501.
26 
Table 4 provides  a more rigorous investigation of police behavior, by  using only a 
specific sample of tickets from the population to determine whether gender and racial differences 
in receiving tickets persist within a specific group.  Column I includes only tickets given to 
                                                 
25 One concern is that 70506 and 70503 may be driving these results.  However, even when these zip codes are 
excluded, the coefficient on the police dummy is smaller, but still significant (.044 at a 5% level).  These zip codes 
include commercial as well as residential areas, similar to the other zip codes in this analysis, so it is unclear why 
there would be a difference in ticketing based on gender in the area. 
26 All specifications were also run using police tickets and both sources of automated tickets, results of which can be 
provided upon request.  In general, the police coefficient decreases compared to the specifications which do not 
include traffic light camera tickets, implying that women and African-Americans actually receive even fewer tickets 
from speed vans than from both automated sources combined.  This could mean that men and whites are more likely 
to adjust behavior when aware of an automated camera (or that they drive comparably slower through intersections).  
Using both automated sources does not change the overall finding that the probability of a ticketed speeder being a 
woman or African-American is higher for tickets issued by police officers, in any specification.  
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women, with the dependent variable a dummy equal to one if the woman is African-American 
and 0 otherwise.  The police coefficient is positive, but it is no longer significant at conventional 
levels.  Of tickets given to women, police do not seem to ticket differentially based on race.  In 
Column II, only tickets given to males are included, and the police coefficient is positive and 
statistically significant.  This suggests that when ticketing men, police are more likely to ticket 
African-Americans as compared to automated sources, relative to ticketing whites.     
Columns III and IV of Table 4 use a dummy equal to 1 if the violator is female and equal 
to 0 otherwise as the dependent variable, but restrict the sample based on race.  Only those 
tickets given to African-Americans are used in the regression reported in Column III, and only 
tickets given to individuals who are not African-American are employed in the regression for 
Column IV.  Column III implies that African-American women are about 9 percentage points 
more likely to receive a ticket from a police officer as African-American men, compared to the 
likelihood of receiving a ticket from an automated source.  Column IV illustrates that it is more 
likely for a white individual to be female if the ticket was issued by a police officer.
27  In 
summary, controlling for gender, a ticketed driver is still more likely to be African -American if 
ticketed by the police, and controlling for being non-African-American, a ticketed driver is more 
likely to be female if ticketed by police. 
VI. Investigating Econometric Issues of Endogeneity 
1. Propensity Score Estimation 
  As previously mentioned, police and automated cameras do not always ticket in the exact 
same location.  Although the preceding sections begin to justify the use of automated tickets as a 
comparison group to police issued tickets, this section aims to more explicitly show that the 
                                                 
27 The comparison group to African-American tickets is actually all other races; however, in Lafayette about 97% of 
the ticketed population is white or African-American.  
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previous findings are valid by implementing a propensity score estimator.  The underlying issue 
is one of selection: if police choose to locate in areas that are different than automated sources, 
the different proportions of tickets issued to African-Americans and women may merely be the 
result of selection bias.  If we think of receiving a ticket from a police officer as the “treatment,” 
where we are interested in the gender and race of the ticketed driver, the propensity score 
estimator provides a method of comparing similar automated and police ticketed speeders.  
Specifically, by estimating the propensity score (the likelihood a driver is ticketed by the police 
based on violation and location characteristics) the selection problem is less severe.
28   
The first step is to estimate the propensity score using a logit model where the dependent 
variable equals 1 if the ticketed driver was African-American.  The propensity score is a function 
of relevant covariates (area dummies, 11-15 Miles Over the Limit, 16-20 Miles Over the Limit, 
More than 21 Miles Over, day of the week dummies, 9:00 to 11:59 AM, 12:00 to 2:59 PM, 3:00 
to 5:59 PM, and 6:00 to 6:59 PM, and month dummies), where conditional on the propensity 
score, they are independent of treatment (Mocan and Tekin 2006).   
  Once the propensity score is estimated, there are numerous methods to estimate a 
nonparametric regression to determine the average effect of treatment on the treated (ATT).  I 
employ nearest neighbor matching with and without replacement, along with radius caliper 
matching.  First, nearest neighbor matching matches individuals ticketed by police with 
individuals ticketed by automated sources based on their propensity score; the observations with 
the closest propensity score are matched.  Nearest neighbor matching with replacement means an 
untreated (automated-issued) individual can be matched multiple times, but nearest neighbor 
matching without replacement limits the use of an automated ticketed individual as a match only 
                                                 
28 Notice however, this is not an end-all solution: if there are unobservable individual driver attributes which are 
correlated with the likelihood to be ticketed by the police as well as correlated with the likelihood that an individual 
is African-American or a woman, standard problems of biased coefficients remain.  
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once.  Since estimation without replacement may depend on the order of the data (Dehejia and 
Wahba 2002), I follow convention and order the data randomly, as well as in ascending and 
descending propensity score order.  The results remain consistent, as can be seen in Table 5.  The 
estimates using nearest neighbor matching with replacement are no longer significant for 
African-Americans, but are still significant when gender is the dependent variable.   
Lastly,  I  employ  radius  matching,  using  two  different  calipers  (range  of  propensity 
scores).  Radius matching uses all automated ticket observations in a specified propensity score 
range  to  match  police  ticketed  observations,  and  the  results  are  overall  similar  to  previous 
columns.  The effect for race loses significance in some specifications, but women consistently 
are more likely to be ticketed by police officers than automated cameras.  This further supports 
results in previous sections. 
2. Utilizing Daylight Savings Time  
  Next,  I explore a slightly different  approach, to  provide suggestive evidence that the 
automated cameras are a valid population measure and comparison group to the police-issued 
cameras.  Similar to Grogger and Ridgeway (2006), I restrict the estimation sample to police-
issued  tickets  between  6:00  AM  and  7:59  AM,  and  between  5:00  PM  and  6:59  PM.    I 
supplement my dataset with sunrise and sunset data taken from the U.S. Naval Base.  As a result 
of daylight savings time, some tickets are issued in the dark while some are issued in daylight, 
even though the clock time of the issued ticket is the same.  In other words, in November the sun 
sets around 5:30 PM, but in October the sun sets around 6:30 PM.  This means that someone who 
received a ticket in November at 6:00 PM received a ticket when it was dark outside, and the 
police officer likely could not see inside the vehicle (and thus, could not determine race or  
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gender of the driver).  However, if another driver was ticketed at 6:00 PM in October, when it 
was light outside, police officers could see inside the vehicle.   
Assuming that police officers cannot observe a driver’s race or gender when it is dark 
outside, any difference in issuance to African-Americans or women when it is light as compared 
to when it  is dark implies that police officers do consider race or gender in issuing tickets. 
Utilizing daylight savings time allows for keeping time of day constant, while providing the 
ability to compare tickets issued in light to those issued in the dark.  A control, Morning, is also 
added in case there are differences in driving patterns during the morning and evening hours 
(Morning=1 if the ticket was issued between 6:00 and 7:59 and 0 if it was issued between 5:00 
and 6:59).  All other controls are the same as previous tables. 
The coefficient of interest is Daylight Visibility, which equals 1 if it is light outside (if the 
ticket was issued on that day after the sun rose and before it set), and 0 if it is dark outside (if the 
ticket was issued on that day before the sun rose or after it set).  Table 6 provides means and 
standard deviations of this new control variable in terms of gender and race, independently as 
issued by police and automated sources.  Since automated cameras are assumed to measure the 
population of speeders at a given location, regardless of whether it is light or dark outside, we 
can compare the proportion of these tickets to those issued by police officers, to determine if 
there is a difference in issuing based on visibility.   
Initially, if we compare police and automated issued tickets only issued during daylight 
hours, when drivers are visible to police, there is an obvious difference in ticketing behavior.  
Police issue a greater proportion of tickets to African-Americans as well as women, though this 
raw  difference  is  only  significant  for  gender.    These  rough  results  coincide  with  the  earlier 
findings of this paper.  Conversely, during dark hours when there is no visibility, the proportion  
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of tickets issued to women and African-Americans by police and automated sources are very 
similar.  Since this difference only arises when there is visibility of drivers, this implies that 
police  are  using  some  subjective  criteria  once  observing  the  speeding  driver  to  determine 
whether or not to issue a ticket.
29  Recall that these estimates include only tickets issued between 
6:00 and 7:59 AM and 5:00 and 6:59 PM, and so it is unlikely that these results are driven by 
differences in driving patterns.  Though these statistics are extremely useful for analyzing trends 
in the raw data, a more thorough approach needs to be used to provide more reliable results.    
  The regression results including daylight controls are presented in Table 7, which support 
the previous results and imply that African-Americans and females are more likely to receive a 
ticket from a  police officer only when race or gender is visible.  If the same exercise is 
performed using only automated issued tickets, the coefficient on  Daylight  Visibility  is  not 
significant, as can be seen in Table 8.  Since automated sources are objective there should be no 
difference in ticketing by race or gender merely because it is light as opposed to dark.   
  The coefficient on Daylight Visibility is significant only when considering police issued 
tickets, which coincides with results when automated cameras are used as the comparison to 
police-issued tickets, providing supportive evidence that the automated cameras can be used as a 
valid comparison group.    
VII. Conclusion 
  This paper aims to explain whether police issue speeding tickets differently to individuals 
based on their race or gender.  I find that in the city of Lafayette, Louisiana, the probability of a 
ticketed driver being  a  woman or African-American is  significantly higher if the ticket  was 
issued by a police officer versus an automated source.  Since automated sources issue speeding 
                                                 
29 It has been discussed that police may still infer gender or race based on the car model, type, or even color.  
Therefore, police may still be able to consider these factors, though at a lesser influence.  
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tickets to every speeding car that passes, this implies that gender and race play a role when police 
decide whether to ticket a speeding driver.  Even when controlling for additional factors like 
severity of the speeding violation, time of day, actual speed limit, and day of the week, the 
results remain the same. 
  This methodology has not been used previously to study police behavior and differential 
treatment in receiving speeding tickets based on gender and race.
30  As a result of the specific 
type of analysis, this paper does not suffer from common issues in this realm of literature.  The 
city implemented the automated camera system to improve safety and decrease the num ber of 
crashes caused by red light runners, and was not intended for any use involving investigation of 
police bias.  Also, these data were not collected as a result of a lawsuit, and therefore police had 
no incentive to alter their behavior.   Similarly, the present dataset includes all speeding tickets 
given during the sample time period and does not rely on police reports.  Every instance when a 
police officer wrote a ticket is included and police cannot misreport their actions. 
  This paper also has a lar ge advantage over existing literature because it employs a 
completely objective measure of the speeding population.  For the most part, vans and police 
officers are located either very close to each other (on the same street or city block), or they are 
within  a  few  blocks  of  each  other.    This  suggests  that  police  officers  and  vans  are  not 
differentially located to deliberately target different sub -populations.  This provides a distinct 
advantage in that after controlling for incident and street characteristics, any differences between 
automated and police issued tickets arise from the subjective nature of police tickets.  
Despite concerns about automated sources being an inexact measure of the population of 
speeders observed by police, I employ numerous tech niques to illustrate that the automated 
                                                 
30 Another study mentioned in Grogger and Ridgeway (2006), done by the Montgomery County Police Department 
(2002), used photographic stoplight enforcement to measure the at risk population of speeders.  However, this study 
could not be accessed, so it is uncertain how closely their methodology relates to the current work.  
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sources do provide a valid population measure.  Suggestive evidence using maps of Lafayette 
and extensive regression controls for location and driver behaviors, as well as propensity score 
estimates and manipulation of daylight visibility all provide the same conclusion: police officers 
ticket a larger proportion of African-Americans and women than automated sources.  However, 
the gender effect is larger, and more consistent throughout all methods. 
  The probability of a ticketed driver being African-American or female is significantly 
higher when the speeding ticket is given by a police officer in contrast to an automated source, 
thus implying that police use gender and race as a determining factor in issuing a speeding ticket.  
Despite  the  fact  that  we  cannot  determine  whether  the  differential  treatment  is  a  result  of 
preference-based discrimination or statistical discrimination, the results still illustrate some type 
of discrimination, which has potential welfare implications. 
For example, assume that police ticket African-Americans at a higher rate not because of 
a taste for discrimination, but because police believe that African-Americans are less likely to 
contest  a  speeding  ticket.    This  would  mean  that  higher  penalties  are  levied  on  African-
Americans than whites despite the fact that they have the same offending (speeding) intensity.  
Given that the incomes of African-Americans are less than half that of whites in this population 
of speeders,
31 this would constitute a regressive tax based on unequal treatment.  Further research 
is necessary to investigate whether differential contesting rates can explain police behavior, or if 
preference-based discrimination is really the cause of the disparities between tickets issu ed by 
police officers and automated sources. 
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 Definitions and Descriptive Statistics 
Variable  Definition  Observations  Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
Police  Dummy Variable (=1) if the ticket was given by a 
police officer, 0 otherwise.  2,817  .36  .48 
Automated  Dummy Variable (=1) if ticket was given by an 
automated camera, 0 otherwise.  2,817  .64  .48 
African-
American 
Dummy Variable (=1) if the ticketed driver was 
African-American, 0 otherwise.  2,408  .26  .44 
Female  Dummy Variable (=1) if the ticketed driver was 
female, 0 otherwise.  2,431  .46  .50 
Area 1  Dummy Variable (=1) if ticket was given in Area 1 
(zip codes 70501 and 70507), 0 otherwise.  2,799  .50  .50 
Area 2  Dummy Variable (=1) if ticket was given in Area 2 
(zip codes 70503 and 70508), 0 otherwise.  2,799  .20  .40 
Area 3  Dummy Variable (=1) if ticket was given in Area 3 
(zip code 70506), 0 otherwise.  2,799  .30  .46 
HalfMth 1  Dummy Variable (=1) if violation was given in the 
first half of the month, 0 otherwise.  2,817  .49  .50 
RushHour 
Dummy Variable (=1) if violation was given 
between 7:00 and 8:59 AM or 5:00 and 6:59 PM, 0 
otherwise. 
2,817  .30  .46 




Dummy Variable (=1) if the driver was traveling 10 
miles or less over the limit, 0 otherwise.  2,795  .41  .49 
11-15 Miles 
Over 
Dummy Variable (=1) if the driver was traveling 
11-15 miles over the limit, 0 otherwise.  2,795  .38  .48 
16-20 Miles 
Over 
Dummy Variable (=1) if the driver was traveling 




Dummy Variable (=1) if the driver was traveling 21 
or more miles over the limit, 0 otherwise.  2,795  .04  .21 
Speed Trav  The speed the driver was traveling when given a 
ticket.  2,795  51.23  8.77 







Means and Standard Deviation, by Area and Ticket Type 
  Area 1  Area 2  Area 3 

































































































































































































Standard deviations are in (parentheses).  The number of observations is in [parentheses]. * 
denotes a significant difference between the automated and police means at a 10% level, ** 




Probit Marginal Effects Using Limited Areas 
  Dependent Variable: 
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Day of the 
Week Fixed 
Effects 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
             
N  777  1101  1628  795  1114  1646 
ln L  -372.61  -506.68  -834.59  -520.34  -741.01  -1098.34 
BIC  751.87  1020.36  1683.97  1047.37  1489.03  2211.49 
The reported values are the marginal effects, estimated using individual-level data.  Robust 
standard errors, clustered by area, are in parentheses.  * denotes significance at a 10% level, and 






Probit Marginal Effects Estimated Using Restricted Samples 
Dep. Variable:  African-American  Female 
Sample Used:  Female Tickets  Male Tickets  AA Tickets  White Tickets 
Variable         
  I  II  III  IV 






























































































































































Month FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
N  774  831  359  1246 
ln L  -387.72  -416.49  -234.67  -827.24 
BIC  788.74  846.42  481.11  1668.73 
The reported values are the marginal effects, estimated using individual-level data.  Robust 
standard errors, clustered by area, are in parentheses.  * denotes significance at the 10% level, 
and ** denotes significance at the 5% level.   Month Effects were not significant except October 
and February in Column II (both at a 10% level of significance), and October and February in 




Propensity Score Matching Estimates 
  Without Replacement  With Replacement  Radius Matching 























































Standard errors are bootstrapped 500 times.  Coefficients are marginal effects of police issued-










Daylight Visibility Means and Standard Deviation of Daylight Controls 
  =1, visibility  =0, no visibility 




























Recall that only a subset of police issued tickets are being used: those issued between 6:00 AM 
and 7:59 AM and those issued between 5:00 PM and 6:59 PM.  Standard deviations are in 
(parentheses).  The number of observations is in [parentheses].  * denotes a significant difference 















Probit Marginal Effects: Investigating the Effect of Daylight on Police-Issued Tickets 
Variable  African-American  Female 














































































































Saturday  -  -  -  - 
Sunday  -  -  -  - 
Month FE  No  Yes  No  Yes 
N  258  258  265  265 
ln L  -144.89  -144.00  -173.53  -171.66 
BIC  300.90  299.10  358.22  354.48 
The reported values are the marginal effects, estimated using individual-level tickets.  Robust 
standard errors, clustered by area, are in parentheses.  * denotes significance at a 10% level, and 
** denotes significance at a 5% level.  Month FE were not significant except for February (at a 















Probit Marginal Effects: Investigating the Effect of Daylight on Automated-Issued Tickets 
Variable  African-American  Female 




























































16-20 Miles Over  -  -  -  - 
More than 20 Miles 
Over 
-  -  -  - 
















































Month FE  No  Yes  No  Yes 
N  119  119  126  126 
ln L  -63.06  -61.65  -67.68  -65.47 
BIC  135.68  132.86  145.03  140.61 
The reported values are the marginal effects, estimated using individual-level tickets.  Robust 
standard errors, clustered by area, are in parentheses.  * denotes significance at a 10% level, and 
** denotes significance at a 5% level.  Month FE were not significant except for October, 
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